Horizon Textiles, Inc. v. Pandelco, Inc.
(2012 WL 6622123,Unpublished)
December 20, 2012; California Court of Appeal, 2nd District, Division 1
When is delivery after the contract-specified date not “late” for purposes of termination due to breach of contract? That question was effectively posed by the Horizon Textiles case.
The buyer, Pandelco, ordered custom-made fabric from seller Horizon Textiles. The contract, based on purchase orders, specified delivery by a certain date. The seller was waiting for final approval of the finished fabric sample before completing the manufacture and delivery of the fabric. If the buyer had given approval, the delivery would have been made a few days late, but still in time for the buyer to meet its customer deadline. Instead of approving the final fabric sample, the buyer waited and canceled the order as “late” under the contract.
The seller prevailed in the trial court and court of appeal. The court of appeal relied on two concepts: (a) application of custom and usage of trade under California Uniform Commercial Code section 2202 (UCC Section 2-202), and (b) common law estoppel, under California Uniform Commercial Code section 21103(b) (UCC Section 1-103(b)).
The seller testified that contract-specified deadlines were not strictly observed in the fabric production industry: “a ‘few days late’ is acceptable in the industry.” The court accepted this as evidence of custom and usage to explain and supplement the contract due date under UCC section 1-103(b).
The court also found there was evidence, in email exchanges and other dealings, that the buyer had agreed to a later delivery of the fabric; and that its non-approval of the final fabric samples and cancellation were inconsistent with the buyer’s earlier actions. The buyer’s email correspondence before the cancellation did not unambiguously state that the buyer would terminate the contract unless delivery were strictly made by the due date. This evidence supported a finding of common law estoppel. The court upheld the enforcement of this estoppel under UCC section 1-103(b), which specifically states the UCC does not displace the principles of equity and estoppel.
The court found email extensions of time constituted “additional terms” that may become part of the contract under UCC section 2-207. That part of the opinion seems less solid, because the purchase orders had presumably been accepted months before the emails were exchanged; these were emails in the course of performance, not contract formation. The concept of estoppel is what seemed to turn the decision in favor of the seller. Seller had done most of the work to deliver the fabric and would have completed it without adverse commercial consequences to the buyer if buyer had promptly communicated its approval of the fabric.